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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE ILLINOIS SEAT BELT LAW: SHOULD
THOSE WHO RIDE DECIDE?
Illinois has recently passed legislation which mandates the use
of safety belts for front seat passengers in automobiles.' While
mandatory use of restraint systems is an effective means to prevent
injury, the enforcement of "buckle-up" laws raises the question of
improper state encroachment on individual autonomy. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,' as
well as challenges based upon improper use of the police power,3
serve to protect the individual from undue state interference with
personal decisions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate and
evaluate the strength of these challenges when applied to the Illinois
Legislature's attempt to mandate use of the seat belt as a personal
safety device. Particular attention will be given to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Fries," which discussed these
challenges in the context of motorcycle helmet legislation.
In People v. Fries,5 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down an
Illinois law which required motorcycle riders to wear helmets.' The
court held that the state had abused its police power when it passed
a law which was specifically intended to protect the health of the
individual. 7 The Illinois seat belt law, like the helmet law, requires
that the vehicle operator take affirmative steps to protect himself
from injury. The seat belt law may therefore come under attack on
the same constitutional grounds as the helmet laws of Illinois and
other states.8 The seat belt requirement may be challenged on the
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 12-603.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[No] state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny ... the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
3. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (challenge to
state's interest in protecting women's working condition); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 395 (1898) (challenge to state's interest in working conditions in mines); City of
Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 398 N.E.2d 829 (1979) (challenge to state's
police power to require that sidewalks be clear of snow and ice).
4. 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
5. Id.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,§ 11-1404 (1983).
7. People v. Fries, 42 11. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1969).
8.

See Love v. Bell, 127 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970); Commonwealth v. Howie,

354 Mass. 769, 328 N.E.2d 373 (1969); State v. Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252
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ground that it does not serve the public safety, health, or general
welfare, and is therefore a violation of due process and an abuse of
police power. It can also be challenged as a law which creates a legislative classification in violation of the equal protection clause. Unlike the Illinois Helmet Law9 which was held unconstitutional in
Fries,0 however, the seat belt requirement can withstand these constitutional challenges.
Courts have long recognized the state's need to regulate highways for the public safety." In fact, the state can invoke its police
power to protect the safety, health, or general welfare of its citizens
whenever the interests of the public require state interference. 2 The
helmet law, it was argued, furthered public safety because helmets
kept debris from striking the cyclist's head and, therefore, prevented
accidents involving other vehicles. A majority of courts accepted this
argument and upheld helmet legislation."3 This same argument can
be used to support mandatory restraint laws such as child restraint
legislation,' and seat belt laws.' 5 The restraints can keep the pasA.2d 232 (1969); People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 272, rev'd, 56
Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 429 (1967), and the respective statutes which those cases
attacked, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-231 (1973); MASs. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90 § 70
(Law. Co-Op. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39.3-76.7 (West 1973); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
381(6) (McKinney 1970).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 § 11-1404 (1983).
10. 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969). It could be noted, however, that Illinois circuit and appellate judges may properly consider themselves bound by the
Fries decision, and forgo distinguishing between helmet and safety belt legislation.
One Marion County judge has done so, and held that the seat belt law was unconstitutional. Chi. Daily L. Bull., Oct 28, 1985, no. 211, at 1, col.1.
11. See, e.g., Haswell v. Powell, 38 Ill. 2d 16, 230 N.E.2d 178 (1967) (driving on
roads and highways is subject to police power whether a right or privilege); Pierce v.
Carpenter, 20 Ill. 2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747 (1960) (motor vehicle code within state
police power); see generally Nierkirk v. State, 260 Ark. 526, 542 S.W.2d 282 (1976)
(speed limit regulated for safety and cost savings); Chicago Park Dist. v. Canfield, 370
I1. 477, 19 N.E.2d 376 (1939) (advertising on vehicles controlled for public safety);
Probus v. Sirles, 569 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. App. 1978) (auto insurance mandated even
though it is a burden on the individual).
12. Goldblatt v. Heamstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898); Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
13. Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831, 835 (1972); State v. Also, 11 Ariz. App.
227, 463 P.2d 122, 124 (1969); Penney v. City of North Little Rock, 455 S.W.2d 132,
134 (Ark. 1970); Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118, 122 (1970); City of Wichita
v. White, 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287, 290 (1970); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans,
253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, 403 (1969); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d
377, 380 (1970).
14. E.g. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 27350-27356 (West Cum. Supp. 1985); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2 § 12-603.1 (1985 Cum. Supp.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2410(4) (Cum.
Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6103.1-03 (1983 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48
(1984 Cum. Supp.).
15. Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Michigan are the first states to pass
such legislation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 § 12-603.1 (1984 Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
1174 (West 1984); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-C (as amended June 18, 1984);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2410(5) (1985).
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sengers in place during an accident and thereby prevent the driver
from losing control of the vehicle after the accident. Theoretically,
this would serve to protect the general public in addition to the individual vehicle occupants because fewer vehicles would become
involved.
When applied to safety belts, however, the public safety argument goes too far. While most courts accepted the relationship between flying debris and public safety when considering the helmet
laws, 6 it can reasonably be said that the helmet may prevent an
accident. The relationship between public safety and the seat belt
law, on the other hand, is more tenuous because it assumes that an
accident has already occurred. The law only serves to protect drivers
who might become involved in an accident because passengers who
have already been involved in an accident did not wear their safety
belts. Requiring passengers to wear seat belts is therefore, clearly
designed to enhance personal, not public, safety. Furthermore, the
Illinois Supreme Court did not accept the public safety rationale in
Fries, and is not likely to accept its weaker application in support of
the seat belt law.
Some courts have stated that helmet legislation would be valid
even if designed to protect only the rider.17 These courts upheld the
legislation on public health grounds, noting the substantial increase
in motorcycles on the road and the alarming number of serious injuries.' s The term "public" to these courts encompassed the relatively
small number of motorcycle riders. Most public health legislation,
however, reflcts a much broader view of the term "public." Legislation that requires innoculations against infectious disease 9 or the
fluoridation of water 2 0 for example, concern health problems which
affect a greater percentage of the public. In addition, this type of
legislation concerns dangers over which the individual has little
control.
16. See supra note 13.
17. State v. Also, 11 Ariz. App. 227, 463 P.2d 122, 125 (1969); Penney v. City of
North Little Rock, 455 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Ark. 1970); State v. Lee, 51 Hawaii 516, 465
P.2d 573, 577 (1970); State v. Darrah, 466 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Mo. 1969); Arutanoff v.
Metropolitan Government, 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408, 411 (1969); State v. Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d 130, 465 P.2d 789, 792 (1969).
18. See City of Wichita v. White, 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287, 289 (1970); Commonwealth v. Coffman, 453 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Ky. App. 1970); State v. Darrah, 466
S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d
377 (1969). See also supra note 17.
19. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Massachusetts' law requiring
smallpox vaccination upheld); Daniel v. Putnam County, 113 Ga. 570, 38 S.E. 980
(1901) (court recognizes power of state to require smallpox innoculations).
20. Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326 (1964) (power to
fluoridate water upheld); Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, 132 N.W.2d 16
(1965) (summary judgment granted against plaintiff's effort 40 'prevent fluoridation).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:193

In terms of public health, the size of the group which the seat
belt law protects is analagous to that in other public health legislation. In this respect, courts may recognize that the pervasive use of
automobiles and the alarming rate of injuries and deaths which inevitably accompany their use, constitute a public "health" problem.
Efforts to curb these injuries and fatalities through the voluntary
use of seat belts have consistently failed.2 Curbing this threat to the
collective health of the citizenry obviously requires state
interference.
Unlike health problems over which the individual has little control, however, the health problem which is sought to be cured by the
seat belt law is one over which the individual has the ultimate control. Should an individual choose not to "buckle-up," it is only the
individual's health that will suffer should that decision turn out to
be unwise. In this respect, the government cannot dictate the individual decision to buckle up any more than it can dictate other individual decisions regarding matters of personal health. On the other
hand, when an individual uses the roads and highways he is acting
in an environment over which the state has a right to control. Courts
will therefore have to balance the individual rights at stake against
the state's interest in protecting the public health. The public health
rationale, though somewhat better than the public safety rationale,
is not, however, the best justification for Illinois' new safety belt law.
By far, the best justification for the seat belt law is that it benefits the general welfare of the public. The state's right to promote
the general welfare assumes a state interest in preserving a strong
and viable citizenry. A viable citizenry is one which is capable of
supporting the state with its tax dollars and one which does not create a drain on the state treasury.22 The seat belt law becomes important in this regard because, despite insurance, the cost to the state
in providing care to accident victims is quite high.2 ' The state also
21. See Arnould, Grabowski, Automobile State Regulation:A Review of the Evidence, 5 RES. LAW. & ECON. 233, 239-245 (1983). On the other hand, where seat belts
are required, as in many foreign countries, use rates vastly improve, and injuries
vastly decrease. Mackay, Seat Belts in Europe, Their Use and Performance in Collisions in PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON OCCUPANT RESTRAINT, 39 (E. Petrucelli R. Green, eds. 1981).
22. See Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 177, 279 (D. Mass. 1972); State v. Also,
11 Ariz. App. 227, 463 P.2d 122, 124 (1969); Love v. Bell, 127 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118,
121 (1970); Commonwealth v. Coffman, 253 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky. App. 1970); State v.
Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1969); see also Sherman-Reynolds v.
Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 323, 265 N.E.2d 640 (1970) (police power includes interest in the
public treasury); Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124 P.2d 593, 598 (1942) (police
power protects public from financial loss).
23. See O'Day, State Legislation and Occupant Restraining in PROCEEDINGS,
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON OCCUPANT RESTRAINT, 24 (E. Petrucelli, R. Green, eds.
1981). It is estimated that the state of Michigan could save over two million dollars a
year on medical costs alone, assuming only a 15 percent reduction in injuries. Id. at 2.
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incurs other costs related to accidents such as police, fire, and ambulance service, as well as the costs involved in supporting the disabled
worker and his family. Because the police power includes an interest
in protecting the public treasury, 4 these costs add up to the power
to regulate the use of safety belts in automobiles.
Justifying the use of safety belt legislation as a valid exercise of
police power satisfies the requirements of due process because, by
definition, a valid exercise of police power contemplates that the
state is acting reasonably for the good of all and is not depriving any
person or minority of their constitutional rights.2 The chance that
the courts will give the decision to "buckle-up" a more protected
status and apply strict scrutiny2 6 is slim indeed: The Supreme Court
has thus far recognized fundamental rights of personal autonomy in
abortion, 27 contraception,28 and family relations,2 9 but has balked at
extending this protected status to the rights to dress as one
pleases,3 0 grow one's hair,3" or choose one's sexual preference.3 2 It is
doubtful that courts will grant fundamental status to the right not
to "buckle-up," while leaving unprotected these more personal decisions. When dealing with a non-fundamental right, the courts require only a reasonable relation between the ends sought by the legislation and the means which the state uses to accomplish these
ends.3 Mandatory use of seat belts is a reasonable method of decreasing the costs which the state incurs from automobile accidents.
The Equal Protection Clause" provides the most interesting
challenges to the Illinois Seat Belt Law. Equal protection requires
that statutory classifications be reasonably related to the ends which
the statute seeks to attain.3 5 This insures that those who are simiThe estimated savings on direct costs is approximately 13 million. Id. at 25.
24. See supra note 22.
25. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1905); City of West Frankfort v. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d 609, 129 N.E.2d 682, 687 (1955); Zeleny v. Murphy, 387 111.
492, 56 N.E.2d 754 (1944).
26. See United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144 at n.4 (1938) (Justice
Stone's footnote, commonly cited as the inception of the strict scrutiny doctrine).
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
30. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
31. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 526 F.2d 838 (remanded because teacher had a speach interest as well as a fourteenth amendment claim).
32. Friedman v. Dist. Court, 201 Cal. 2d 28, 611 P.2d 77 (1980) (attorney subject to dress code in court).
33. See People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 403 N.E.2d 1029 (1980) (reasonableness applied to legislation on controlled substances); Illinois Gamefoul Breeders Ass'n
v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d. 443, 389 N.E.2d 529 (1979) (reasonableness applied to regulations
on raising gamefoul); Finishline Express v. Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 131, 379 N.E.2d 290
(1978) (reasonableness applied to off-track betting).
34. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
35. See infra note 37.
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larly situated will be treated similarly. The classification created
under the Illinois law is reasonably related to the law's objective,
but is extremely under inclusive. This is because the Illinois law,
like the seat belt laws of other states, 6 only requires that front seat
passengers use seat belts. For equal protection purposes, the classification created divides all front seat passengers from all automobile
passengers. Whether the public health, safety, or general welfare is
chosen as the proper basis for the law, this classification is underinclusive.
If the seat belt law stands on public safety grounds, reason
would require that all passengers buckle up. The public safety is
served when the driver maintains control of the vehicle. An unbelted
occupant, wherever seated, can easily be hurled into the front compartment. This could obstruct the driver's view or even injure the
driver and thereby interfere with his control of the vehicle. This
would defeat the purpose of requiring the driver to use his safety
belt for the purpose of public safety. In the context of public safety,
all passengers of the vehicle constitute one class and should be
treated similarly.
Public health and general welfare arguments cannot justify the
legislative separation of the front and back seat passengers. The
public health justification is based upon protecting the numerous
victims of automobile accidents. Requiring only front seat passengers to wear seat belts is like innoculating only certain members of
the public from an infectious disease, and leaving other members
unprotected. The general welfare argument is similarly flawed. It assumes that only injuries incurred by front seat passengers become a
drain on the public treasury.
Within the context of its legislative purpose, the Illinois Seat
Belt Law treats similarly situated persons differently. The exclusion
of the back seat passengers is not reasonably related to the purpose
of the law, thereby discriminating against front seat passengers.
Courts, however, generally do not set aside under-inclusive laws on
the basis of their under-inclusiveness.3 7 Legislatures are permitted
to attack a problem one step at a time. It is doubtful, therefore, that
the Illinois Seat Belt Law will be declared unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.
The seat belt law has sufficient police power and constitutional
grounds on which to stand. The law employs a reasonable means to
protect the state's financial interest, foreclosing any challenges
based upon improper use of police power. Because the right not to
36. See supra note 15.
37. See Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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buckle up is not a fundamental right, due process and equal protection only require a rational basis for the law. The rationality test
allows the legislature wide discretion in how it enforces its police
power objectives. This discretion is constitutionally exercised in the
case of the Illinois Seat Belt Law. Despite the constitutional challenges which will no doubt be employed to set aside Illinois' seat
belt law, one fact cannot be denied: the use of safety belts is an
effective device to enhance public safety which can be mandated by
law.
Daniel Compton

